$MIMIC will be used to facilitate voting on token grants and other operational aspects of the protocol, such as smart contract development and new feature development for the Mimicry Markets GUI. Eventually smart contract upgradability will be removed to protect all players. After that event, token holders will still be able to vote to modify exit and advertising fees earned by the protocol, other key earning ratios, allowed settlement tokens, treasury grants, gated features, and more.
In order to disincentivize someone forking Mimicry, upon eventual protocol maturity, all efforts should be made by the community to optimize key ratios and the use of treasury funds in favor of a profit-neutral balance sheet. Concretely this means that the community may vote to allow treasury surpluses to be used for airdrops or deflationary mechanisms. Further, if revenue to the foundation is ever activated, it may later be removed entirely in favor of maximizing economic incentives for Actors, Directors, and Producers.
We strive to reach a truly decentralized and unstoppable network so we will be leveraging our amount- and time-weighted reward-earning design for governance as well, where Mime holders may vote on proposals in accordance with their pro-rata share of reward-earning weight at the time of their vote. Accordingly, the longer Mimes are time-locked (from 1 week up to 4 years), the more voting power they hold. This will reward the players who most adamantly believe in the future of this protocol with greater governance control, while also effectively removing $MIMIC from the circulating supply to increase demand pressure on the token itself.
Concretely this means that only those players who risk $MIMIC within time-lock positions will have the ability to participate in protocol governance.
Mime holders may choose to assign the voting power of their Mime to any other player whom they trust to make decisions in the best interest of the protocol. The original holder will still retain their Mime and all rights associated with it other than governance, regardless of which player they may have assigned their votes to. Furthermore, they may choose to revoke voting delegation rights at any time.
We expect Producers to use $MIMIC to keep large positions open for long periods of time on the markets they believe will have the most activity so they can maximize their reward-earning yield. Additionally, we also expect Producers to be the most active participants in governance proposals for the protocol. Actors are less likely to time-lock their positions because they may want to reduce their position sizes from time to time. Some players may also choose to deposit $MIMIC within LP pools on decentralized exchanges in order to capture trading fees.