Price Manipulation Risk

Perhaps the most notable risk is reference-price manipulation. This may occur if a nefarious Director creates a new Pantomime using a reference-price oracle that they can easily manipulate. For example, this could happen if the Director creates a Pantomime for an NFT collection where they control most or all of the NFTs in that collection, or if they control the price oracle they use to launch the Pantomime, or if they solely control a centralized API endpoint that an is using for its price feed.

These risks are chiefly mitigated by utilizing oracles that have battle-tested smart contracts, well-designed economic incentives for disputes, and game theory that incentivize reporters to write accurate price information on-chain. Additionally, we believe our community of Actors will avoid Pantomimes that use reference-price calculations that are easy to manipulate with wash-trading, such as NFT Collection Floor Price, in favor of more fraud-resistant measures such as the NFTGo Market Cap or the Time-Adjusted Market Index of an NFT collection.

Further, there is a 60-minute cooling period whenever someone attempts to remove liquidity from their positions. This delay is specifically designed to allow oracles enough time to begin the dispute process on a price feed, thus locking the retrieval of funds by a potentially nefarious player until the dispute is resolved within the underlying oracle protocol. Then, in practice, a community vote will be needed to unlock funds that were previously locked.

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